ABSTRACT. This paper deals with zero-sum nonstationary stochastic games with countable state and action spaces which include both Shapley's stochastic games [11] and infinite games with imperfect information studied by Orkin in [7] . It is shown that any nonstationary stochastic game with a bounded below lower semicontinuous payoff defined on the space of all histories has a value function and the minimizer has an optimal strategy.
Introduction.
Before we describe our game model, let us accept some conventions. Let N denote the set of positive integers, and R the set of real numbers. If /, g : S -> R are functions on a nonempty set S, then f < g means that f(s) < g(s) for each s E S. If S is a countable set, then by P(S) we denote the set of all probability measures on the cr-algebra of all subsets of S. Finally, throughout the sequel we shall-tacitly-assume that any countable set is endowed with the discrete topology, and the countable product of such sets is endowed with the usual product topology.
A nonstationary two-person zero-sum stochastic game G which we consider is defined by a two-person stochastic control system {Sn,Xn, Yn,qn,u;n G N} where: (i) Sn is the state space of the system at stage n G N. Sn is assumed to be a nonempty countable set.
(ii) Xn and Yn are the action spaces for players I and II, respectively, at stage n G N. It is assumed that Xn (Yn) is a nonempty countable (finite) set.
Let Hx = Si, Hn = Si x Xx x Yx x ■ ■ ■ x Sn, and H^ = Si x Xi x Yi x 52 x X2 x Y~2 x • • •• Then Hn is the set of histories up to stage n G N, and iioo is the set of all histories of the game.
(iii) {</"} is the law of motion of the system, i.e., qn : Hn x Xn xFn^ P(Sn+i) is a transition probability such that qn(hn,xn, yn, -) is the condition distribution of the stage of the system at stage n + 1 given the history hn G Hn and the actions %n G Xn and yn G Yn chosen by the players at stage n.
(iv) u: Hoc -> R is the payoff function. It is assumed that u is a bounded below lower semicontinuous (l.s.c. in short) function on H^.
The game is played as follows. The players I and II observe the initial state si G Si of the system and choose simultaneously actions ij eli and yi £ Yj, respectively. Then the result (zi, yi) is announced to both of them and the system moves -to a new state s2 G S2 according to the probability distribution qi(si,xi,yi,-), upon which I chooses x2 G X2 while II chooses y2 G F2, etc. The result of this infinite sequence of moves is a point h -(si,xi,yi,s2,x2,y2,...) G Hx and II pays I the amount u(h). For each n G N, let n" (r") be the set of all functions (transition probabilities) from Hn to P(Xn) (P(Yn)).
A (behavioural) strategy for player I (II) is a sequence 7r = {fn} (7 = {gn}), where /" G Un (gn G r") for each n G N. We denote by II (r) the set of all strategies for player I (II).
According to the theorem of Ionescu-Tulcea (see [3, p. 149 or 5, Proposition V 1.1]), for each pair 7r = {/«}, 7 = {gn} of strategies there exists a unique conditional probability P7ri(si, ■) on K -Xi x Yi x S2 x X2 x Y2 x S3 x X3 x Y3 x • • • given the initial state si such that for each cylindrical set Cn = {xi} X {yi} X ■ ■ ■ x {sn} X {xn} x {yn} x {sn+i} x Xn+i x Yn+i x ■ ■ ■ c K we have n Pvr1(si,Cn) = YI fk(hk,{xk})gk(hk,{yk})qk(hk,xk,yk,{sk+i}), fc=l where hi = si, hk = (si,xi,yi,... ,sk), 2 < k < n.
Thus, each pair tt, 7 defines an expected payoff to player I in the game G at an initial state si G Si to be
From (iv), it follows that E(u,tv,^) is a bounded below extended real-valued function of the initial state.
Define, for each si G Si,
Werner and U{G)(si) = inf supE(u,ir,~j)(si). Throughout the sequel we shall assume that there exists a strategy 7 G T such that (v) sup E(u,ir,"i)(si) < 00 for each si G Si.
Tren
Let e > 0 be given and suppose the value function Val(G) exists.
A strategy 7r* G II is called e-optimal for player I if
A strategy 7* G T is called e-optimal for player II if
Tren REMARK 1.1. Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [11] . He considered a special case of the game described above in which Sn = S, Xn = X, and Yn = Y for each n G N and some finite sets S, X, and Y. The law of motion {</"} in Shapley's game is stationary, that is, qn(hn,xn,yn,-) = q(sn, xn,yn, •) for each hn = (si,xi,yi,...,sn) G Hn, xn G Xn, yn G Yn and some q: S xX x Y -> P(S).
Moreover, the payoff is accumulated over stages with a discount factor ß (0 < ß < 1), so that for each history h = (si,xi,yi,...) G H^,,
where r is a (payoff per stage) function on S x X x Y. (Of course, (1) is continuous on -ffoo-) Such a game is called a discounted Markov (or stationary stochastic) game. (For further results concerning Markov games we refer to [1, 4, 6, 8] and the references therein.) REMARK 1.2. Let Sn = {n} and let Xn be finite for each n G N. Then our game reduces itself to an infinite game with imperfect information studied by Orkin in [7] . The goal of this paper is to extend Orkin's approximation theorems for infinite games from [7] to nonstationary stochastic games defined above. REMARK 1.3. The game introduced here is inspired by a nonstationary stochastic control system in the sense of Hinderer [3, Chapter I] . Some different nonstationary stochastic games were studied by Sengupta [10] and Schäl [9] . In the model of Sengupta [10] the state space is an independent of time compact metric space, the action spaces are finite, the payoff is l.s.c. on the set of all histories, but the law of motion is stationary. Schäl has considered in [9] a game model with Borel state and action spaces in which player I, similarly, player II, may base his decision at any stage n on the whole history (si, s2,..., sn) of the system and on his own previous actions only. In other words, each of the players cannot take into account at any stage the previous choices of his opponent.
Such a restriction concerning the players does not take place in our model.
Finite horizon games.
Let m G N be fixed and let um be a bounded below real-valued function on Zm = Hm x Xm x Ym. Then um may be recognized as a continuous function on H^ and it may be considered as a payoff function of some nonstationary stochastic game in the sense of §1. Such a game is called a finite horizon game because the payoff is decided here in the first m moves.
We have the following fact. PROPOSITION 2.1. Every finite horizon nonstationary stochastic game satisfying (i)-(v) has a value function. Moreover, for each e > 0, player I has an e-optimal strategy and player II has an optimal strategy.
Before we prove Proposition 2.1, let us introduce some auxiliary operators. Let w: Zn -> R be bounded below, /" 6 Il", and gn G r", n G N. Then we put (2) (Afngnw)(hn) = J2 J2 w(hn,xn,yn)fn(hn,{xn})gn(hn,{yn}), Note that Afn9n is isotone for each fn,gn, i-c, ^4/ng"w < Afn9nv if w < v, and A/n9n(w + c) = Afngnw + c for any constant c. Similar facts hold for Qn, n G N.
Let 7T = {/"} G n and 7 = {gn} G T. It can easily be verified that for any finite horizon game with the payoff function um we have (4) E(um,ir,i) = AfigiQiAhgiQ2-■ ■ A}m_igm_1Qm^iAfmgmum. and, moreover, we can find f*t G Um and gm G rm such that, for every fm G ïlm and gm G Tm, 
for every tt G n and 7 G T.
Define -K*m -(#,/},..., fm-Ufm) and 7^ = (g*x,g2, . ■ • ,&_i,0m). UsinS (4)> (5) and the elementary properties of the operators (2) and (3), one can check that E(u^.7r,74)
<-E(tim-i,T,7m-i) and E(um-i,irm_x,~f) < E(um,ir*m,~i) + e/2 for all 7T G n and 7 G T. Hence and from (6) we infer U(Gm) < sup E(um, it, 7m) < inf E(um, it*m, 7) + e < L(Gm) + e.
vren "/er
This implies that Gm has a value function, 7^ is an optimal strategy for player II and /T^j is an e-optimal strategy for player I, which terminates the proof. REMARK 2.1. Let 7 = {gn} G T be arbitrary and let 7^ = {gn}, n < m, be an optimal strategy for player II in the m-stage game. Then 7* G T defined by 7* = (ffî, 92, ■ ■ ■ > 9m, 9m.+ i,9m+2, • • •) is an optimal strategy for him too.
3. Compactness of the set of strategies for player II. Let us assume that each set r" = {gn: Hn -> P(Yn)} is endowed with the topology of pointwise convergence. Since each set Yn is assumed to be finite, so each P(Yn) is a compact metric space. Thus, from Tychonoff's theorem and the countability of sets Hn, n G N, we infer that each r" is a compact metrizable topological space. Now, let us endow T = Ti x T2 x ■ ■ • with the product topology. Then T is a compact metrizable topological space too.
We shall need the following fact.
LEMMA 3.1. Consider a finite horizon game with a payoff um defined on ZmHm x Xm x Ym. Then, for each si G Si and ir G n, the function E(um,n, -)(si) is lower semicontinuous on V.
PROOF. First note that without loss of generality we may assume that um is nonnegative.
Then observe that under (i) and (ii) the set Zm may be represented as a denumerable sequence {zn}. Let wn: Zm -> R be defined as follows: wn(z) -um(z) if z -zn and wn(z) -0 otherwise. Let vn = u>i + w2 + ■ ■ ■ + wn, n G N. Clearly, vn / um as n -> oo. By the monotone convergence theorem, E(vn,7T,-)(sx) / E(um,ir,-)(si) as n -> oo (si G St, tt G n). It is quite obvious that each function E(vn,ir,-)(si) is continuous on T. Thus, E(um,it,-)(si) as a limit of nondecreasing sequences of continuous functions on T is l.s.c. on T, and this completes the proof.
Let Hn = Sn+i x Xn+i x Yn+i x Sn+2 x Xn+2 x Yn+2 x ■ • -, n G N. Define um-Zm^ Rby Val(G) = lim" Val(Gn), where Gn, n G N, are the finite horizon games with payoffs un defined according to (7) . Moreover, for any e > 0 player I has an e-optimal strategy and player II has an optimal strategy. PROOF. Note that Val(Gn) < Val(G"+i) < L(G) for each n G N. Hence limn Val(Gn) < L(G). By Proposition 2.1 and Remark 2.1, for each n G N, player II has an optimal strategy 7" G T in G". Since T is a compact metrizable space, so {in} contains a subsequence {ink} converging to some 7* G T. wen Thus, the game G has a value function and 7* is an optimal strategy for player II. Now, let e > 0 be given. For each si G Si, let ttSi be an e-optimal strategy for player I at state si G Si. A strategy tt for player I relying on using ttSí when the initial state is si is an e-optimal strategy for him. Thus, the result follows. PROOF. By Theorem 4.1, each game G* has a value function. Moreover, in each game Gn player II has an optimal strategy. Since un / u as n -> 00, so the rest of the proof proceeds along lines similar to Theorem 4.1.
Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 generalize the main results of Orkin from [7] . The methods of proofs developed here are essentially different than those used by Orkin in [7] .
The conclusion of Theorem 4.2 may fail if we assume that the sequence {un} of l.s.c. payoffs is nonincreasing and u -lim"u". This follows from [7, p. 215 Since player I has only one strategy in this game, say n, so Val(G) = infier E(u,ir,')).
It is easy to see that Val(G)(0) = -1, but for each stationary strategy 7 of player II we have E(u, ?t,7)(0) = 0. Thus, player II has no optimal stationary strategies.
